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Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First 
Amendment 
Cleta Mitchell† 
By way of introduction, let me note that I am an attorney 
engaged full-time as a practitioner in political law. I spend my 
days advising people who want to be involved in politics and 
public policy issues as to how they can do that within the con-
fines of the law. 
In my experience, politics is a highly regulated business at 
the federal, state, and local levels of government. It is an unfor-
tunate truism in the United States today that before one can 
safely interject one’s views into the political arena, one had best 
identify an attorney practicing in this area and add his or her 
phone number to speed dial. But how do we square that reality 
with what George Will calls the “most beautiful five words in 
the English language”?1 He is referring, of course, to the first 
five words of the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution—“Congress shall make no law . . . .”2 
Those of us who take my side of the Citizens United v. 
FEC3 decision—and other recent successes in the constitutional 
challenges to the substantive restrictions and regulation of po-
 
†  Cleta Mitchell is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Foley & 
Lardner LLP and a member of the firm’s Political Law Practice. With more 
than 30 years of experience in law, politics and public policy, Ms. Mitchell ad-
vises corporations, nonprofit and issue organizations, candidates, campaigns, 
and individuals on state and federal campaign finance law, election law, and 
compliance issues related to lobbying, ethics and financial disclosure. Ms. 
Mitchell practices before the Federal Election Commission, the ethics commit-
tees of the US House and Senate and similar state and local enforcement bod-
ies and agencies. Copyright © 2012 by Cleta Mitchell. 
 1. George F. Will, Not a State-Broken People, CATO POL’Y REP., July/Aug. 
2010, at 1, 10, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v32n4/cp32n4 
-1.pdf. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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litical speech4—actually believe in all the protections specified 
in the First Amendment. We believe that not only does the 
press enjoy certain protections from government intrusion into 
its communications, but that ordinary citizens—even when or-
ganized into corporations, LLCs, or partnerships—enjoy the 
same freedom from government intrusion into, and control 
over, their political speech and activities. 
The media and media corporations love the regulation of 
everyone else’s speech because they have their very own carve-
outs from regulations.5 Many media corporations have howled 
loudly about the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
because the Court had the temerity to breathe new life into 
protections for other kinds of corporations besides the New 
York Times Company and the Washington Post Company and 
the company that owns Minnesota’s Star Tribune.6 
Have you ever thought about the fact that the largest 
newspaper in Minnesota7 is, in fact, owned by a corporation? It 
has had an interesting corporate lineage these past few years. 
New York City-based Avista Capital Partners bought it from 
the McClatchy newspaper corporation in 2007,8 it filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009,9 and, when it emerged from 
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved of new ownership 
consisting of the company’s largest secured creditors: Angelo 
Gordon & Co., Wayzata Investment Partners, Credit Suisse, 
 
 4. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476–77 (2007) 
(holding that there is no legitimate interest in regulating political advertise-
ments “that are neither express advocacy nor its functional equivalent”). 
 5. See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . .”). 
 6. See Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2010, at A30 (predicting that Citizens United will allow corporations to “over-
whelm elections and intimidate elected officials into doing their bidding”); 
Kent Greenfield, Op-Ed., Court Got the Answer Wrong in Citizens United but 
Asked the Right Question, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 21, 2012, at 
A9; Editorial, Judicial Activism Inc.: The Supreme Court Tosses out Reasona-
ble Limits on Campaign Finance, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at A20 (arguing 
that Citizens United’s holding was “unnecessary” and made “a mockery of 
some justices’ pretensions to judicial restraint”). 
 7. Newspaper Search, AUDIT BUREAU OF CIRCULATIONS, http://abcas3 
.accessabc.com/ecirc/newsform.asp (under “State Selection” choose “Minneso-
ta,” sort by “Total Circulation—Descending,” and click “State Search”). 
 8. Press Release, The McClatchy Co., McClatchy Completes Sale of Star 
Tribune to Avista Capital Partners (Mar. 5, 2007) (on file with Minnesota Law 
Review), available at http://www.mcclatchy.com/2007/03/05/1843/mcclatchy 
-completes-sale-of-star.html. 
 9. David Phelps, Star Tribune Files for Chapter 11, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis, Minn.), Jan. 16, 2009, at A1. 
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CIT Bank, and an affiliate of GE Capital.10 The Star Tribune has 
come a very long way from being devoid of corporate influence. 
One of the little discussed parts of Citizens United is the 
Court’s recognition that exempting media corporations from the 
type of regulation, reporting, and prohibitions to which other 
corporations are subjected amounts to Congress conferring a 
“speech license” to certain corporations, while depriving others 
of the same.11 That, of course, is anathema to the First 
Amendment. It seems to me, however, that if one is truly com-
mitted to the First Amendment—all of it—then one must be 
overjoyed by Citizens United. 
But those who revere, promote, and espouse the need for 
ever more intricate and complex campaign finance regulation—
who are happiest when legislatures and government agencies 
spew forth metastasizing laws and regulatory schemes that dic-
tate what people can and cannot do or say in the political are-
na, and who bemoan the cacophony of “too much speech” and 
fret over too many voices in the political space—have made it 
clear that they would rather repeal or amend the First Amend-
ment rather than let it serve as a barrier to their clamor for end-
less government regulation of political speech and activity. 
Indeed, the campaign finance “reformers” have persuaded 
more than one member of Congress over the past two decades 
to introduce proposed constitutional amendments to change the 
First Amendment in various ways,12 and to erase the precious 
rights that James Madison so carefully sought to protect when 
writing the First Amendment in the First Congress of the 
United States.13 
 
 10. Chris Newmarker, Star Tribune Emerges from Bankruptcy, No New 
CEO Yet, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www 
.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2009/09/28/daily4.html?page=all. 
 11. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (holding that 
differential regulatory treatment based on whether or not a corporation has a 
media outlet “cannot be squared with the First Amendment”); see also Cleta 
Mitchell, Debating the Disclose Act: It’s a Cynical, Selective Muzzle . . ., WASH. 
POST, June 17, 2010, at A21 (“In Citizens United, the court held that the First 
Amendment doesn’t permit Congress to treat different corporations different-
ly . . . . Otherwise, it would be tantamount to a congressional power to license 
the speech of some while denying it to others.”). 
 12. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 90, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), http://www.gpo 
.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hjres90ih/pdf/BILLS-112hjres90ih.pdf (proposing a 
constitutional amendment expressly prohibiting corporate campaign  
contributions). 
 13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 2009) (arguing that limiting liberty as a means of curing po-
litical friction is a remedy “worse than the disease”); see also Nixon v. Shrink 
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I.  RESPONSE TO CITIZENS UNITED: REGULATION   
So, with Citizens United, and a restoration of basic consti-
tutional protections to citizens and citizens groups, what are 
the political-speech police left to control in order to ensure their 
place in the regulatory firmament? Disclosure.14 As the senti-
ment goes, if we can’t outlaw the speech, let’s chill it. Or freeze 
it. 
Not too long ago, I attended a legislative hearing in Texas 
to testify on a term-limits proposal that had been introduced 
into the Texas House of Representatives.15 It was the very last 
day for bills to be voted out of committee during that session of 
the legislature and since the Texas legislature only meets every 
other year,16 any bill that did not make it out of committee that 
day was dead for two years. The bill I was there to testify on 
had been moved to the very end of the agenda, so I got to listen 
to all the bills on the agenda that day.17 
There were several bills of note, but the one I remember 
best is instructive on this topic. A state representative from 
Waco, home of the Baylor Bears, had introduced a bill to regu-
late the prices that ticket scalpers could charge for tickets to 
the annual Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo.18 Now, at first 
glance the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo may not seem 
like much. However, the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo 
has been happening annually since 1932 and is the largest live-
stock entertainment event in the world.19 It lasts for twenty 
days each spring, attracts over 2 million attendees,20 and gen-
 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 424 n.9 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (employ-
ing The Federalist No. 10 in support for limiting regulatory caps on campaign 
contributions). 
 14. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regula-
tion and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 486 (2007) (arguing 
that disclosure proponents “hope that the regulations will make undesirable 
conduct too expensive relative to desirable, alternative conduct, thus inducing 
a shift from the former to the latter”). 
 15. See H.R. 2629, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993).  
 16. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
 17. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on State Affairs, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. Apr. 13, 1993), available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/legis 
CmteMinutes/HouseCmtes/73-0/State_Affairs/04131993.pdf. 
 18. See H.R. 668, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993). 
 19. See History, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO, http://www 
.rodeohouston.com/about/history.aspx ( last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 20. See Attendance, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO, http://www 
.rodeohouston.com/about/attendance.aspx ( last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
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erates revenues of over $100 million.21 It is a big deal in Texas. 
This legislator was pretty worked up—and apparently had 
been worked up for several years—over the prices that people 
were paying to ticket scalpers for tickets to the Houston Live-
stock Show. So she had introduced a bill to regulate ticket 
scalping. When she was recognized to offer and explain her bill, 
she said something I will never forget. It seems that for several 
years prior to this legislature she had been introducing bills to 
prohibit scalping rodeo tickets.22 Apparently, until then, her 
bills had never seen the light of day. So when she stood up to 
explain the latest version, she said something to the effect of, 
I’ve been trying for years to outlaw ticket scalping of Houston 
Livestock Show tickets. I can’t get that bill passed. So if we can’t 
or won’t outlaw ticket scalping, then we should do the next best 
thing . . . we should regulate it. 
II.  THE DANGERS OF DISCLOSURE   
So if we cannot outlaw corporate independent candidate-
related speech because of the Court’s decision in Citizens Unit-
ed, let’s do the next best thing—let’s regulate it. And the way 
we can best regulate—and chill—independent candidate-
related speech is through disclosure. 
I believe that the Supreme Court is not yet fully apprised 
of the dangers disclosure poses through the intentional chilling 
of political speech. Disclosure is the next frontier for those of us 
who toil in these vineyards—it will constitute the next wave of 
legal jurisprudence in the campaign finance arena. In the same 
way litigants challenged the substantive prohibitions on certain 
kinds of speech, over time we have to make the case and build a 
record about the threat posed by disclosure. 
I attended the oral arguments in Doe v. Reed, where the 
Supreme Court remanded the case based upon evidentiary 
findings of potential harassment due to the disclosure of the 
names of petition signers appearing on a marriage protection 
initiative.23 On October 17, 2011, the trial court ruled there was 
insufficient evidence of potential harassment and ordered the 
disclosure of the names of the petition signers.24 It was not a 
 
 21. See Financial Highlights, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO, http:// 
www.rodeohouston.com/about/financial-summary.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 22. See, e.g., H.R. 2253, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1989). 
 23. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010). 
 24. Doe v. Reed, No. C09-5456BHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814, at 
*50–51 (D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2011).  
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great decision in my view, but we shall see how that case 
evolves. 
During oral argument, Justice Scalia raised the question: 
What is the big deal about disclosure?25 He explained that 
“running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic cour-
age.”26 To date, Justice Scalia has been true to this sentiment: 
he refuses to recognize that the next best thing to prohibiting 
certain speech and association is to force disclosure in onerous 
ways, in an effort to chill speech that otherwise is constitution-
ally protected. 
In theory, I agree with Justice Scalia. I do believe that 
running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic courage 
and that we should not fear disclosure of our views. But I also 
know that there are deliberate, organized, well-funded, and 
well-orchestrated efforts on the Left to identify donors to con-
servative causes, candidates, and organizations, and to attack 
those donors, intimidate them, and, ultimately, to close their 
checkbooks, silencing those conservative voices.27 
All one has to do is look at what happened to donors in Cal-
ifornia who financially supported Proposition 8, the ballot ques-
tion adopted by the people of California that legally defines 
marriage as being between one man and one woman. The evi-
dence of the harassment campaign against donors to Proposi-
tion 8 is so extensive, and was so widespread, that it was doc-
umented in a report published by the Heritage Foundation—
The Price of Prop 8.28 All donors who gave $100 or more (donors 
who gave certain large amounts had to disclose their donors, so 
 
 25. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–29, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/09-559.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 12.  
 27. See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson, Obama’s Enemies List, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
1, 2012, at A15 (arguing that President Obama and his allies have worked to 
“demonize and stigmatize David and Charles Koch,” private citizens and pro-
lific political donors, and suggesting that the Kochs, although they are not 
running for any political office, have been singled out as “political punching 
bag[s]” because they contribute generously to organizations that oppose some 
of Obama’s policies); see also Jeremy W. Peters, Obama Fights Back Against 
Koch Brothers in New Ad, THE CAUCUS (Jan. 18, 2012, 8:12 PM), http:// 
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/obama-fights-back-against-koch-brothers 
-in-new-ad/ (describing an Obama campaign commercial as “striking” in the 
way in which it targets the Koch brothers specifically, referring to them as 
“[s]ecretive oil billionaires”). 
 28. Thomas M. Messner, The Price of Prop 8, HERITAGE FOUND. BACK-
GROUNDER (Heritage Found., D.C.), Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www 
.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the-price-of-prop-8. 
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we had disclosure of donors to donors)29 were subjected to 
threats and harassment, their property was vandalized, their 
jobs were threatened or terminated, and on and on.30 The pro-
gay marriage forces shared Google Maps to the residences of 
donors to Proposition 8, which were then used for attack pur-
poses by those who disagreed with the Proposition 8 donors.31 
The disclosure of those who make a contribution to a political 
cause, candidate, or ballot issue is not supposed to result in 
threats of bodily harm, harassment at home and at work, in-
timidation, or getting your car keyed and your job threatened. 
Yet, that is precisely what happened to donors to Proposition 8 
in California. 
This pattern is appearing regularly across the country. In 
2010 in Minnesota, when Target Corp. gave a contribution to 
 
 29. The following information must be reported about an individual who 
contributes $100 or more to a campaign: his or her full name, street address, 
occupation, and the name of his or her employer or, if self-employed, the name 
of the business. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(f ) (West 2012). For each person who 
contributes to donations that total $500 or more, the following information 
must be provided: the contributor’s full name, his or her street address, the 
amount of each expenditure, and a brief description of the consideration for 
which each expenditure was made. Id. § 84211(k)(6). 
 30. See Complaint at 18–25, ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 
2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-00058-MCE-DAD) (describing specific 
instances of harassment faced by those who supported Proposition 8 and indi-
cating that some donors would not make future contributions because of these 
threats). For a broader discussion of the chilling effects that may result from 
strict campaign finance disclosure laws, see William McGeveran, Mrs. McIn-
tyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1, 20–24 (arguing that contribution disclosure rules impose costs, 
including “incursions on autonomy and dignity interests,” that might discour-
age those who are weary about having their political beliefs displayed to the 
public from contributing). 
 31. See Messner, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining how websites, including 
Google Maps, have allowed opponents to Proposition 8 to identify the approx-
imate geographic locations of its supporters). For an example of a website that 
contains donor information within an interactive map, thereby allowing web-
site users to determine the identity and location of Proposition 8 supporters, 
see Prop 8 Maps, EIGHTMAPS, http://www.eightmaps.com/ ( last visited Feb. 7, 
2012) (saying in the site’s caption that, “Proposition 8 changed the California 
state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage. These are the people who 
donated in order to pass it,” and indicating contributors by flags on a map 
that, when clicked on, provide donors’ names, occupations, and the amount of 
their contributions). Critics of this map worry that providing opponents to 
Proposition 8 with so much identifying information regarding its supporters 
will increase the acts of vandalism and harassment already reported by sup-
porters. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 30, at 21 (describing instances of sup-
porters’ windows being broken and other instances of vandalism, including 
graffiti, property damage, and sign theft).  
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an entity that made independent expenditures related to the 
governor’s election, the hue and cry against Target by liberals 
resulted in Target’s public apology for exercising its First 
Amendment right (articulated by the Supreme Court in Citi-
zens United).32 Target then, according to press reports, made an 
equivalent contribution to an opposing group with a promise 
not to contribute again.33 Mission accomplished. 
The danger with disclosure is that it has ceased to be about 
information on who supports or opposes which candidate or 
causes. I have my doubts as to whether it actually ever was 
about that. It is, instead, about identifying political opponents 
in order to silence them. And that is the cottage industry being 
spawned by the disclosure provisions not invalidated by the 
Supreme Court in Citizens United. 
Since Citizens United, regulators are being forced by the 
Supreme Court to regulate on a narrower and narrower playing 
field, that of disclosure. It is there where we are now encounter-
ing the regulatory excess that practitioners have encountered 
for more than thirty years with more substantive restrictions. 
If we can’t prohibit the speech, we will regulate it . . . . Indeed, 
liberal interest groups and legislators are attempting to regu-
late disclosure to excess and well beyond the scope of constitu-
tional permissibility, in my view. 
III.  MINNESOTA: A CASE STUDY   
When the Supreme Court ruled in January 2010 that stat-
utes prohibiting corporations—or any other groups of people 
associated together in whatever form—from making independ-
ent candidate-related expenditures were unconstitutional, 
Minnesota was one of over 20 states with what we referred to 
in our amicus brief as having “Offending State Statutes.”34 
Those were laws that prohibited corporations from making in-
dependent, candidate-related expenditures.35 Most states re-
 
 32. Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Campaign Spending Puts Target in 
Bull’s-Eye, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010, at A01; Press Release, Target Corp., A 
Message to Target Team Members from Gregg Steinhafel, Target Chairman, 
President & CEO (July 27, 2010) (on file with Minnesota Law Review). 
 33. See Press Release, Target Corp., supra note 32. 
 34. Brief of American Justice Partnership and Let Freedom Ring as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2359479 [hereinafter Citizens United Amicus 
Brief ]; see also Ian Urbina, Consequences for State Laws in Court Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at A1. 
 35. Citizens United Amicus Brief, supra note 34; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
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pealed the statutes,36 or state attorneys general issued opinions 
of nonenforceability,37 or made similar moves to recognize and 
comply with the Supreme Court’s decision.38 
Minnesota, on the other hand, enacted a law which recog-
nized that corporations could not be prohibited from making 
such expenditures, but—the next best thing—the law now re-
quires any corporation making such expenditures to establish a 
political fund or PAC in order to do so.39 And for nonprofit enti-
ties requiring the disclosure of donors, the allocation of mem-
bership dues, fees, and contributions is quite draconian.40 
As of November 2011, the enacted law has already been 
challenged in federal court.41 The Eighth Circuit, for instance, 
heard argument on the constitutionality of requiring the crea-
tion of any kind of separate reporting account or committee as a 
prior condition of exercising protected constitutional rights of 
speech and association.42 Time will tell what the Eighth Circuit 
decides.43 
What is most disturbing at this time, however, is what the 
Minnesota Campaign Finance Board has done in the back half 
of 2011, in a brazen expanse of its jurisdiction and regulatory 
authority, all in the name of—what else—disclosure. This time 
the expansion of authority is related not to candidate speech, 
but to speech and activities concerning ballot questions. 
 
ANN. § 15.13.010 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.503 (West 2009).  
 36. See Act of Apr. 18, 2010, ch. 36, 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (amending 
Alaska law to allow campaign expenditures by corporations). 
 37. See, e.g., Applicability of 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 05-10 Wis. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 1, 12 (2010), available at http://www.doj.wi.gov/ag/opinions/OAG-05-10.pdf 
(“In the present situation, it is my understanding that the Government Ac-
countability Board has already suspended its enforcement of the corporate ex-
penditure prohibition in Wis. Stat. § 11.38(1)(a)1. I agree with that enforce-
ment decision . . . .”). 
 38. See, e.g., John Lavelle, Pa. Dep’t of State, EFFECT OF CITIZENS UNIT-
ED ON PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION LAW STATUTES (2010), available at 
http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/statutry/pubs/lavellearticle.pdf.  
 39. Minn. Stat. § 10A.12(1a) (2010). 
 40. Id. §§ 10A.12(5), 10A.20. 
 41. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th 
Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 10-2136 (8th Cir. July 12, 
2011). 
 42. Id. 
 43. After affirming the district court’s finding that the challenge was un-
likely to succeed on the merits, the Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc 
and vacated the opinion, but has yet to issue a decision. Minn. Citizens Con-
cerned for Life, 640 F.3d 304, 313–19; id., No. 10-2136 (8th Cir. argued Sept. 
21, 2011). 
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The Minnesota Campaign Finance Board has asked the 
legislature for years to expand certain definitions in the statute 
to include corporations for purposes of the agency’s regulatory 
authority.44 Something the legislature has not seen fit to do.45 
For many years, going back to 1997, it has been for the Board 
to determine whether a corporation—any corporation, whether 
for profit or not-for-profit—can contribute to a ballot question 
committee and the ballot committee would report the donation 
from the corporation, disclose the name, the amount, etc.46 Be-
yond that, the Board had previously concluded it did not have 
further jurisdiction to control corporate contributions to ballot 
committees.47 
But with some high profile referenda on the ballot for 2012, 
there has been a flurry of activity and effort by the Board to 
change all that, and to totally rewrite the laws governing ballot 
measure campaigns. As of January 1, 2011, the law was clear 
and simple. Contributions from corporations—whether for prof-
it or not-for-profit corporations—made to ballot committees 
were reported to the Board by the ballot committee.48 But that 
wasn’t good enough for the Minnesota Campaign Finance 
Board. 
To increase its power over ballot measure campaigns, the 
Board pursued several avenues. First, the Board tried the legis-
lative route. A bill was introduced that would have statutorily 
defined a ballot expenditure committee and created a compre-
 
 44. See Vote Delayed on Corporate Donation Disclosure Change, Minn. 
Pub. Radio (June 14, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/ 
06/14/ballot-questions-donations/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; see also Disclosure Related to Ballot Question Committees, Advi-
sory Op. 419, Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd. 1, 1–7 (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ao/AO419.pdf (describing disclosure require-
ments for expenditures to promote or defeat a ballot question); Contributions 
from Unregistered Associations to Ballot Committee, Advisory Op. 257, Minn. 
Ethical Practices Bd. 1, 2–3 (Jan. 24, 1997), http://www.cfboard.state 
.mn.us/ao/AO257.pdf (establishing that disclosure requirements for unregis-
tered associations do not apply to corporations contributing to ballot  
initiatives). 
 47. See Contributions from Unregistered Associations to Ballot Commit-
tee, Advisory Op. 257, Minn. Ethical Practices Bd. 1, 2–3 (Jan. 24, 1997), 
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ao/AO257.pdf (“Minnesota Statutes, chapter 
10A, imposes no requirements on a corporation making a contribution to the 
Committee. The Committee is required to keep records and report the contri-
bution in the same way it records and reports all other contributions  
received.”). 
 48. See id. at 1–7. 
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hensive regulatory scheme for ballot questions mirroring the 
regulations imposed on independent expenditures related to 
candidates in 2010.49 That bill did not pass in the legislature.50 
The law remains unchanged from the way it has been for fif-
teen years or more. 
So what’s a regulator to do? Apparently, the absence of leg-
islative authority isn’t an insurmountable problem when you 
have a determined regulator! All you need to do is ignore the 
fact that the legislature didn’t enact the bill you hoped that 
they would enact. The Minnesota Campaign Finance Board, for 
example, in June of 2011, rescinded the advisory opinions that 
had guided the Board’s interpretation of the law since 1997,51 
and issued “guidance” that now purports to subject citizens 
groups to the same regulatory process for ballot question activi-
ties as for candidate-related expenditures.52 Strangely enough, 
these “guidances” provided by the board are not rules promul-
gated under the Administrative Procedures Act.53 
How did they get there? By rewriting the law by saying in 
effect, “this isn’t law; it is how we will apply the law.” And the 
guidance provided actually rewrites statutory definitions and 
adds definitions that exist nowhere in the laws of Minnesota. 
Some of the definitions that the Board has unilaterally altered 
include adding language to statutory definitions of key legal 
 
 49. H.R. 1533, 87th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 2011), available at http://wdoc.house 
.leg.state.mn.us/leg/LS87/HF1533.0.pdf; S.F. 1225, 87th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 
2011), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bin/showPDF.php.  
 50. See H. JOURNAL, 87-3052, 2011 Supplement, at 5339 (Minn. 2011), 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2011-12/Jsupp2011 
.htm#5339; S. JOURNAL 87-3052, at 3600 (Minn. 2011), available at https://www 
.revisor.mn.gov/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=Senate&f=SF122
5&ssn=0&y=2011&ls=87; Tammera R. Diehm, Campaign Finance Alert: Corpo-
rate Contributions to Ballot Committees, INSIDE THE MINNESOTA CAPITAL 
(June 16, 2011), http://www.insideminnesotacapitol.com/campaign-finance/ 
campaign-finance-alert-corporate-contributions-to-ballot-committees/ (“While 
proposed legislative changes to Chapter 10A received hearings in both the 
House and Senate this spring, they were not adopted.”).  
 51. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REGULAR SESSION 
MINUTES 1, at 3 (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ 
bdinfo/minutes/Minutes_Reg_6_30_2011_FINAL%20with%20attachments.pdf. 
 52. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., STATEMENT OF 
GUIDANCE 1, 1–4 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ 
law/Guidance_BQ_Disclosure_10_4_11.pdf; see also Disclosure Rules Apply, 
Campaign Finance Board Says, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 4, 2011), http:// 
minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/10/04/disclosure-rules-apply-votes 
-campaign-finance-board/.  
 53. MINN. STAT. § 14.05 (2010).  
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terms of art in the campaign finance arena: contribution,54 as-
sociation,55 independent expenditures.56 There are new defini-
tions that appear nowhere in the Minnesota statutes in this 
context: solicitation,57 among others. Who knows if this new 
regulatory scheme enforceable? But this scheme is precisely 
why a citizen or citizens’ group, like National Organization for 
Marriage, is forced to retain a legal expert to try and decipher 
the meaning and application of these kinds of regulatory 
schemes.58 
This particular program is nothing more than government 
coercion. It is offered under the guise of a safe harbor against 
government enforcement.59 What that means in the event a 
complaint is filed by political opponents of those who support or 
oppose a particular point of view is still unclear. So much for the 
bright lines required under First Amendment jurisprudence. 
IV.  MEDIA RESPONSES TO OVER-REGULATION   
This approach is quite simply lawless. No statute has 
changed but the entire regulatory scheme for ballot question 
campaigns in Minnesota is different. Under the guise of disclo-
sure the entire regulatory framework has been rewritten by an 
agency director and approved by only a handful of people.60 
How do they get away with such utter disregard for basic 
principles of due process, administrative law, and legislative 
 
 54. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., STATEMENT OF GUID-
ANCE 2–4 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/law/ 
Guidance_BQ_Disclosure_10_4_11.pdf. 
 55. See id. at 1. 
 56. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REGULAR SESSION 
MINUTES 7 (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ 
bdinfo/minutes/Minutes_Reg_6_30_2011_FINAL%20with%20attachments.pdf. 
 57. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., STATEMENT OF GUID-
ANCE 3–4 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/law/ 
Guidance _BQ_Disclosure_10_4_11.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., Advisory Op. No. 419, MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLO-
SURE BD. (JAN. 3, 2012), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ao/ 
AO419.pdf. 
 59. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., STATEMENT OF 
GUIDANCE 1 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/law/ 
Guidance_BQ_Disclosure_10_4_11.pdf. 
 60. See Sasha Aslanian, Board: Large Donors on Amendment Campaigns 
Must Be Disclosed, MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 30, 2011), http://minnesota 
.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/06/30/large-donations-meant-to-influence 
-amendment-voting-must-be-disclosed-board-says/ (“The board . . . voted 5-1 to 
require corporations that give at least $5,000 to a ballot measure[] to name 
those people who contributed $1,000 or more.”). 
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prerogative? Where is the watchdog media? In my opinion, the 
media watchdogs applaud the lawlessness because the media 
loves campaign finance regulation. In the media’s eyes, any 
means are justified by their revered ends; the more regulation, 
the better. 
Government regulation of political speech is always a big 
hit with the media, because it is always regulation of other 
people’s speech.61 Every campaign finance statute in the coun-
try, federal and state, exempts the media from its application.62 
So the media can applaud the regulation and they rarely if ever 
question the constitutional permissibility of regulating political 
speech. They have no reason to because they are always ex-
empt. Regulators know they can act with impunity in this are-
na, so long as they are increasing the amount of regulation. 
Criticism only comes if an agency says there is something it 
cannot do.63 When an agency concludes that the Constitution 
doesn’t allow a certain kind of regulation, the media pounces on 
the agency and complains that they are not “doing their jobs.”64 
All this in the name of the new holy grail: disclosure. 
V.  INFORMATIONAL INTEREST   
What does it matter if we know who gave the money to 
support the Catholic Archdiocese, if the Catholic Archdiocese 
spends or gives money to support marriage?65 What difference 
does it make for me to know who gives money to the Sierra 
Club to oppose hydraulic fracturing?66 And for that matter, if 
 
 61. See Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Fail-
ure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1730–31 (2009) (pointing out that the media is generally 
exempt from federal campaign finance law). 
 62. Id. (discussing the media exemption from federal campaign finance 
law); see, e.g., COL. CONST. art. XXVIII §§ 2(8)(b)(I)–(II) (exempting print and 
broadcast media from the definition of campaign “expenditures”). 
 63. Cf. Nick Timiraos, Housing Finance Regulator Defends Against Crit-
ics, WSJ.COM (Oct. 29, 2011, 1:58 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203687504577005873884253542.html (detailing criticism 
of housing finance regulator for claiming he lacks statutory authority to re-
duce mortgage loan balances). 
 64. Id. 
 65. But see Rose French, Facebook Effort Urges Boycott of Basilica Block 
Party, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 16, 2011, at B1 (discussing con-
troversy over Archdiocese’s financial support of marriage amendment  
campaign). 
 66. But see Felicity Barringer, Donations to Sierra Club Raise Ire, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A11 (illustrating that the source of donations to the 
Sierra Club can generate substantial public controversy). 
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we are going to be consistent, why should a media corporation 
such as the Star Tribune be able to spend corporate dollars 
promoting or opposing a ballot question without having to have 
the editorial signed by its author and a filing with the Minneso-
ta Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board that disclos-
es the revenues received by the corporation that may have been 
used to pay for the expenses of writing and disseminating the 
editorial?67 
So on the issue of disclosure, we have to drill down: What 
is the purpose of the disclosure? What is the constitutional jus-
tification for the regulation requiring disclosure? Does it com-
port with First Amendment jurisprudence? Or is it a regulation 
just for the sake of regulation and because we want to know be-
cause we want to know? When does disclosure become mandat-
ed government voyeurism or an invasion of privacy? There are 
balancing tests that have just begun to be applied to disclosure 
regulations. It is the next frontier of campaign finance regula-
tory litigation. 
  CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE   
Am I opposed to disclosure? My response is, it depends. 
Disclosure in the abstract may be a good thing. I hear the ar-
guments: “It is only disclosure . . .” or, “What’s wrong with 
transparency?” And I respond to those arguments this way: 
“Box cutters are handy household tools, unless and until they 
are used as weapons to threaten pilots and flight attendants so 
jumbo jets can be crashed into the Pentagon and the Twin 
Towers.” When disclosure is used as a means to chill and freeze 
protected First Amendment rights, it is simply a box cutter 
shredding the Constitution. Because in this context we are 
dealing with rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, we 
must tread lightly and carefully, and we must remember those 
blessed and beautiful five words: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . .”68 
 
 67. Cf. A “No” Vote on State Referendum, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), 
Oct. 19, 2008, at OP4 (urging readers to vote against a ballot measure without 
disclosing its funding sources or their potential interests in the outcome). 
 68. See supra notes 1–2. 
